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Abstract 
 
This essay examines the Snowden affair as a sort of Rorschach test that traces the 
contours of what I am calling the impasse of cynical reason. In particular, I contend that 
the emerging form of algorithmic dataveillance both elicits and actively thwarts 
theoretical and critical approaches predicated on a normative, symbolic model of 
epistemology that this form aspires to supplant. As a result, what such approaches tend 
to discern in the emerging culture of surveillance are its own epistemological 
commitments – the very ones comprising the impasse of cynical reason. Breaking out of 
this impasse will thus require disrupting the deep, hidden complicity of such critique with 
its ostensible object. I contend that this will require taking seriously the often 
disingenuous or fallacious arguments on behalf of dataveillance in order to overcome the 
critical resistance to the quite genuine eventuality they connote – that of the decline of 
cynical reason as the prevailing form of social coordination. 
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The Snowden leaks have prompted a 
profusion of both public and academic 
commentary, much of it now extending 
well beyond more immediate concerns 
about the encroachments of the national 
security state, the role of the press in 
aiding what the state construed as a 
criminal act, and the implications of both 
the leaks and the surveillance programs 
they disclosed for civil liberties and 
democratic transparency. The comment-
ary has evolved and expanded 
sufficiently to prompt one astute critic to 
add the concept of ‘surveillance culture’ 
to the more familiar ‘surveillance state’ 
and ‘surveillance society’ (Lyon 2017). If 
Snowden’s act revealed or confirmed the 
emergence or consolidation of this new 
culture, it is because its reception by 
professional journalists and academics 
has ascribed this distinctive capacity to 
it. By the same token, the importance 
accorded to this act as a cipher for the 
emerging ‘culture of surveillance’ tells us 
something important about the impetus 
for and the process of deciphering it.  
 
In particular, it seems that a certain 
enigmatic circularity has come to shape 
the burgeoning literature on Snowden, 
Big Data and ‘surveillance culture’ more 
generally. 1  Put very roughly and 
schematically, a prevalent strain of 
criticism demonstrates convincingly that 
the emerging regime of dataveillance 
represents a fundamental break with the 
social, political and epistemic premises 
that preceded it, while nevertheless 
insisting that it can only be understood 
and challenged on the basis of those 
                                                
1 I confess this is largely an impressionistic 
observation, even if it was earned by reading 
some three hundred articles and books on the 
subject. I trust readers familiar with the pertinent 
literatures will corroborate the impression, or at 
least concede that the patterns examined here 
are commonplace and influential. 
outmoded premises. Moreover, the same 
critics assert that this new regime at 
once poses a grave threat and is little 
more than a feeble, pointless blunder 
destined to fail. To complicate matters 
further, this kettle logic (Derrida 1998) 
cannot be explained as either a 
contingent mistake or a symptomatic 
formation. This is because a certain 
social reflexivity, or what has been called 
the contemporary rule of ‘cynical reason’ 
(Sloterdijk 1987), functions precisely by 
proliferating such explanations (Luhmann 
1996) which consequently no longer 
serve to resolve the symptoms they 
ostensibly unravel (Žižek 1999, 346).  
 
What, then, can this kettle logic tell us 
about the prospect of coming to terms 
with the culture of surveillance if the very 
appearance of this culture threatens to 
blunt, if not obviate, the critical tools 
used to discern it? If there is an answer 
to this question, it will require grasping 
the predicament that gives rise to it – or 
what I am here calling the impasse of 
cynical reason. In what follows, I examine 
the Snowden affair as a sort of 
Rorschach test that traces the contours 
of this impasse. In particular, I contend 
that the emerging form of algorithmic 
dataveillance both elicits and actively 
thwarts theoretical and critical 
approaches predicated on a normative, 
symbolic model of epistemology that this 
form aspires to supplant. As a result, 
what these approaches tend to discern 
in the new regime are its own 
epistemological commitments – the 
ones that comprise the impasse of 
cynical reason. Breaking out of this 
impasse will thus require disrupting the 
deep, hidden complicity of such critique 
with its ostensible object. The analysis 
below is offered as a first step in that 
direction. 
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A Marginal Anecdote 
 
A month after Edward Snowden’s 
revelations detailing the vast scope and 
dubious legality of NSA surveillance, the 
Slovenian newspaper Delo published an 
interview with Wikileaks founder Julian 
Assange (Krečič 2013), conducted from 
his asylum at the Ecuadorian embassy in 
London. The article’s title alluded to 
Assange’s remarks, in which he 
described his organization’s activities as 
‘spying for the people’, or rendering 
practices of surveillance publicly visible: 
‘If states have their intelligence agencies 
to spy on us and control us, should the 
people and history itself also not have 
their own counterintelligence?’ By way of 
Wikileaks and whistleblowers like 
Snowden and Chelsea Manning, ‘the 
people’ can monitor those in power, 
fulfilling the defining ideal of democracy: 
‘In a way, we continue the old project of 
Enlightenment. We stand for what some 
philosophers call the ‘public use of 
reason’ – not only against private 
companies and interests but also against 
states and their apparatuses’ (Krečič 
2013).2 
 
Almost immediately, Slovenian 
philosopher and cultural critic Slavoj 
Žižek published three versions of an 
editorial on Snowden and Assange 
(2013a, 2013b, 2014), endorsing and 
elaborating upon the latter’s remarks to 
argue that the gesture of ‘spying for the 
people’ is not a direct negation of spying 
… but its self-negation, i.e., it 
undermines the very universal principle 
of spying, the principle of secrecy, since 
                                                
2 Subsequent events cast grave doubts on 
Assange’s claim to be acting in the service of 
democracy. But the rhetorical efficacy of such 
claims in lending prima facie credibility to the 
leaks remains intact, and thus highly instructive. 
 
its goal is to make secrets public’. 
Accordingly, he concurs with his 
colleague Alenka Zupančič that the leaks 
were direct enactments of a genuine 
political alternative, a ‘commons of 
information’, or, as Assange puts it, a new 
‘people’s encyclopedia’ indispensable to 
struggles against the commodification of 
communication and ubiquitous surveill-
ance.  
 
For reasons that will become both plain 
and puzzling, Žižek contends that, 
against the ‘shameless cynicism of the 
representatives of the existing global 
order who only imagine that they believe 
in their ideas of democracy’, the 
proscribed revelations actualize the 
Kantian ideal of the public use of reason 
constitutive of democratic autonomy 
(2013b). Moreover, in stark contrast to 
his own longstanding views,3 Žižek insists 
that ‘Kant parts ways with our liberal 
common sense’ when he ‘opposes 
“public” and “private” use of reason: 
“private” is for Kant the communal-
institutional order in which we dwell (our 
state, our nation…), while “public” is the 
trans-national universality of the exercise 
of one’s Reason’ (2013b). In rendering 
surveillance transparent, ‘spying for the 
people’ epitomizes the ideal that those in 
power earnestly proclaim but 
systematically subvert, enacting Kant’s 
                                                
3 Žižek has consistently and cogently argued that 
the problem with Kant emerges precisely insofar 
he embodies the liberal common sense and thus 
marks the limits of democratic reason by 
identifying within it the principle of its own self-
subversion. In other words, he has claimed both 
that Kant’s views are perfectly consistent with the 
self-conception of liberal democracy, and that 
this form of democracy is not an ideal to be 
realized but an obstacle to be overcome. In fact, 
the key insight animating his objections to the 
Kantian view, coupled with his well-known 
critique of ‘postmodern’ cynicism, are precisely 
what is at stake in the question of surveillance. 
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‘basic axiom of the public law: “All 
actions relating to the right of other men 
are unjust if their maxim is not 
consistent with publicity”’. A secret law, a 
law unknown to its subjects, legitimizes 
the arbitrary despotism of those who 
exercise it’ (2013a). 
Soon after the publication of Žižek’s 
editorials, Mark Andrejevic, a leading 
theorist and critic of surveillance and 
related practices, offered his own 
vigorous defense of Wikileaks (2014), 
articulated in decidedly similar terms. 
Responding to the sharply conflicted 
public reception of Assange’s revelations, 
he explains that ‘WikiLeaks [sic] 
represented … a challenge to 
established practice based on a tacit 
understanding between political, 
economic, and media elites. … turning 
the tools of the informated elites back 
upon them’ (2619). Citing an older 
editorial by Žižek, Andrejevic claims that 
‘WikiLeaks confronts established powers 
‘by challenging the normal channels of 
challenging power and revealing the 
truth (Žižek, 2011, para. 8)’, channels that 
have been co-opted by those elites 
(2014, 2620). In sum, Wikileaks is 
carrying out the brief normally assigned 
to the press – the task of making power 
accountable to the public by 
‘contribut[ing] to the universalization of 
the ‘inspection principle’ (2627), a term 
coined by none other than Jeremy 
Bentham. 
If indeed Assange and Snowden have 
carried out the duty of supervision 
reserved for the press, it would follow 
that they have fulfilled the Kantian ideal 
that Žižek, Dean (2002) and Andrejevic 
have painstakingly shown to be a prime 
cause of democracy’s self-induced crisis, 
its complicity with communicative 
capitalism, and the decline of symbolic 
efficiency.  
Žižek’s awareness of this contradiction 
surely explains why he insists on 
distinguishing ‘spying for the people’ 
from the ‘liberal common sense’ 
embodied in the principle of supervision. 
Certainly, the journalists and pundits 
covering the leaks have no reason to 
think that their noblest professional 
ideals facilitate such perverse outcomes. 
And the problem may simply have 
eluded Andrejevic’s notice.  
However, scholars and critics of 
dataveillance routinely confront 
variations of this contradiction, which 
emerges symptomatically in the form of 
mutually refuting claims and concerns. 
Notwithstanding the charge of cynicism 
on the part of the press, the proposition 
that ‘spying for the people’ is no longer 
spying but the exercise of democratic 
supervision also emerged as a dominant 
trope in news coverage of the Snowden 
leaks. This is surely because the 
whistleblowers themselves repeatedly lay 
claim to it, but also because journalists 
understand their professional role in 
normative democratic terms, as serving 
the interests of ‘the people’ by routinely 
exposing the machinations of official 
authorities to public scrutiny (Greenwald 
2013; Nichols 2013; Engelhardt 2014; 
Friedersdorf 2014). Barton Gellman 
(2013) explicitly makes this point in his 
email exchange with Snowden:  
Perhaps I am naive’, [wrote 
Snowden], but I believe that at this 
point in history, the greatest danger 
to our freedom and way of life 
comes from the reasonable fear of 
omniscient State powers kept in 
check by nothing more than policy 
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documents’. The steady expansion 
of surveillance powers, he wrote, is 
‘such a direct threat to democratic 
governance that I have risked my 
life and family for it. 
 
Pursuing the suggestive principle of 
‘reasonable fear’ to its inevitable 
conclusion, James Risen, himself a target 
of Federal prosecution for publishing 
classified information disclosed to him, 
observed that: 
 
I don’t think there’s any personality 
that’s more American than a 
whistleblower. … The entire 
personality and DNA of America 
[consists] of people who wanted to 
have their own kind of government 
and be free of oppression. And I 
think that is the heart of what a 
whistleblower is. It’s somebody who 
believes that civil liberties or 
freedom or corruption are 
important issues that they need to 
talk about, and their right as an 
American is to talk about it with 
the press. (2013) 
 
Risen here affirms the ‘liberal common 
sense’ encoded, contra Žižek, in 
Habermas’s explicitly Kantian ‘principle 
of supervision’ as, precisely, a practice of 
surveillance functionally assigned to the 
press but conducted on behalf of and 
before ‘the people’ as the collective, if 
abstract, sovereign subject of democratic 
politics (Habermas 1974, 52). Appositely, 
the trope of public supervision has been 
indispensable to the critical literature on 
surveillance and Big Data (e.g., Allmer 
2011; Fuchs 2011; Hier & Greenberg 
2009; Gandy 2006; Lessig 1999; Lyon 
2014; Marx 2004; Monahan 2010; Simon 
2005; Turow 2014; O’Harrow 2005; Wood 
2009). Indeed, even ‘post-panoptic’ and 
‘post-representational’ analyses of 
dataveillance, despite their explicit 
rejection of discursive and 
intersubjective models of politics, 
continue to appeal explicitly to this 
principle (e.g., Haggerty & Ericson 2000; 
Lyon 2006; Andrejevic 2013; Amoore 
2013; Bauman 2013). 
 
In both public and academic debates on 
surveillance, then, the ideal of 
supervision by and for ‘the people’ is the 
ultimate court of appeal, epitomizing the 
‘liberal common sense’ that Žižek 
nonetheless attempts to distinguish from 
its paradigmatic expression in Kant, 
which he has repeatedly argued signals 
democracy’s inherent self-subversion 
and the source of its inevitable failure 
(Žižek 1991, 229–277; 1999, 322–369). 
Indeed, he has explicitly glossed the 
hacker fantasy 4  as an index of 
democracy’s structural paranoia, which 
forms the obverse of its normative 
skepticism toward authority: 
 
the heroine … hunched over a 
computer, frantically works against 
time to … access … ultra-secret 
information (say, about the 
workings of a secret government 
agency involved in a plot against 
freedom and democracy, or some 
equally severe crime). Does this 
topic not represent a desperate 
attempt to reassert the big Other’s 
existence, that is, to posit some 
secret Code or Order that bears 
witness to the presence of some 
Agent which actually pulls the 
strings of our chaotic social life? 
(1992, 264) 
 
The double gesture of disavowal is 
suggestive. On the one hand, Žižek’s 
endorsement of Assange and Snowden 
                                                
4 Represented in the 1995 film The Net. 
		
	
 www.cf.ac.uk/jomecjournal         @JOMECjournal 	
170	
directly contradicts his own previous 
critique of both Kant and the principle of 
publicity as politically disabling. On the 
other hand, it contradicts his own prior 
critiques of such acts as exemplars of 
the paranoia engendered by the 
principle of publicity.  
 
Whether ‘spying for the people’ is 
authentically Kantian in its putative break 
with liberal common sense, or the 
exemplary instance of this common 
sense, the outcome is the same: the 
principle of publicity is at the heart of the 
problem with democracy that Žižek has 
diagnosed. In his view, appeals to 
democratic transparency drive the 
‘decline of symbolic efficiency’ intrinsic to 
the reflexive regime of communicative 
capitalism (Žižek 1999, 322–369; Dean 
2002). From this perspective, there are 
two equally intolerable alternatives: 
either the leakers are fulfilling the 
paranoid fantasy of positing a new 
Master, or their revelations actualize the 
principle of supervision, thereby disabling 
political agency by feeding the endlessly 
escalating glut of information that 
replaces and forestalls the collective 
autonomy it purports to realize. 
 
This is why the quixotic attempt to 
extricate ‘spying for the people’ from its 
central place in the democratic 
imaginary is not a contingent error but is 
rather emblematic of a wider 
predicament confronting critical 
surveillance studies. It is no accident 
that, while he leans heavily on Žižek’s 
work to explain the conjunction of 
cynicism and paranoia produced by the 
democratic dissolution of symbolic 
authority, Andrejevic (2013) nonetheless 
advocates more public supervision of 
new information technologies and 
practices. The logic of Bentham’s 
‘inspection principle’ driving ‘infoglut’ is 
called upon to solve the problems it 
generates, confirming Jodi Dean’s (2002) 
diagnosis of publicity as the primary 
ideological vehicle of communicative 
capitalism. 
 
It would seem, then, that ‘spying for the 
people’ designates a kind of double bind. 
As paranoid fantasy, it justifies the 
dismissal of democratic supervision as a 
kind of fetishistic compulsion. But as the 
materialization of democracy, it 
reinforces the regime it is supposed to 
contravene. Critics of dataveillance are 
compelled to appeal to it, but in so 
doing, they risk becoming helpless 
collaborators with the ‘system of distrust’ 
(Dean 2002) on which communicative 
capitalism relies. Finding our way out of 
this predicament will require looking 
beyond the norm of publicity to grasp 
the full epistemic implications of the 
algorithmic form and speculative 
function dataveillance is rapidly 
assuming. 
 
This is evident in the way ritual appeals 
to the principle of supervision beg the 
question they purport to answer, 
confronting us with ostensibly 
irreconcilable conceptions of ‘the people’ 
of democracy. Public discussion of 
Snowden has framed him as either a 
patriot or a traitor, highlighting the vexing 
but paradigmatic convergence between 
citizenship as compliant membership 
and citizenship as critical distance, or 
even perpetual recalcitrance, refusal or 
rebellion (Kaplan 2010). Moreover, as 
Žižek and others have long argued, the 
convergence is integral to liberalism’s 
depoliticizing project, which here 
emerges as a disorienting overlap 
between critical public discourse and 
paranoid conspiracy fantasies (Dean 
2000). So understood, ‘the people’ of 
democracy is inherently self-destructive, 
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since its ‘supervisory’ function in relation 
to official authority amounts to obligatory 
political cynicism. ‘Spying for the people’ 
is perhaps the most succinct formulation 
of this mandate, which configures 
politics as an interminable hermeneutics 
of suspicion, and so rationalizes 
ignorance, apathy and normative 
skepticism toward both authority and 
expertise (cf. Downs, 1957; Cappella & 
Jamieson, 1997), facilitating the 
commodification of public discourse by 
the circuitry of digital communication. 
What, then, are we spying for when we 
are ‘spying for the people’? The answer I 
sketch below is that this rhetorical 
gesture signals something more and 
other than a ‘return’ to the foreclosed 
principle of publicity and the necessarily 
self-defeating recuperation of 
democratic supervision. Instead, I argue 
that the Snowden controversy 
encapsulates the ongoing confrontation 
with an algorithmic mode of 
dataveillance (Clarke 1988) that 
undermines the social imaginary within 
which the counterfactual category of ‘the 
people’ – operationalized in the principle 
of supervision – has long played a 
decisive, if ideologically ambiguous, role. 
If the rhetoric of liberal democracy 
organizes a reflexive pragmatics around 
the empty place of power and a 
corresponding semantics of ‘the people’ 
as the notional agent of supervision 
(inaugurating the crisis of symbolic 
investment and the reign of cynical 
reason), algorithmic dataveillance 
undertakes to dispense with both 
understanding and its reliance on the 
interpassive structure of belief, and so 
with judgment and decision, as the 
governing principles of social life. Where 
the decline of symbolic efficiency 
denotes a crisis of authoritative 
knowledge on which subjects can rely 
and from which they can conceal 
secrets, the secret now being ‘exposed’ is 
that knowledge itself – understood as 
meaning generated through processes of 
signification articulated to intersubjective 
economies of affective investment – is 
being delaminated from the production 
and maintenance of social order.  
Understood from this vantage, the wistful, 
incongruous call for democratic 
supervision of surveillance harbors an 
aspiration to evade the challenge 
algorithmic dataveillance poses for the 
forms of knowledge, authority and 
symbolic action presupposed by the 
principle of supervision itself. Hence the 
problem is not that surveillance 
abrogates privacy and the public use of 
reason, but that its emergent form 
threatens to extricate the symbolic order 
from the democratic imaginary, 
rendering this order autonomous. 
Democracy, Communicative 
Capitalism and Cynical Reason 
To discern the problem, consider Žižek’s 
intertwined critiques of Kantian publicity, 
democracy, and the decline of symbolic 
efficiency. In his early work, Žižek (1989) 
detects a homology between his own 
Lacanian theory of politics and Lefort’s 
(1988) account of democracy: 
The Lacanian definition of 
democracy would then be: a 
sociopolitical order in which the 
People … do not exist as a unity… 
Because the People cannot 
immediately govern themselves, 
the place of Power must always 
remain an empty place; any person 
occupying it can do so only 
temporarily, as a kind of surrogate, 
a substitute for the real-
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impossible sovereign … (1989, 
165) 
 
However, he soon becomes skeptical of 
the notion that democracy is consistent 
with Lacanian theory (Žižek 1991). 
Reading Kant through Lacan, Žižek 
observes that in deriving the universality 
of the moral Law, Kant deprives it of all 
particular (‘private’) motivation, so that 
the subject must act without any 
‘pathological’ reason, out of duty alone. 
For Kant, the force of this duty derives 
from two interrelated sources. First, the 
subject gives himself the law in the form 
of a maxim that universalizes the 
subject’s rational interest in maintaining 
moral order. Second, the subject is 
obliged to follow this maxim because 
reason dictates it: the self-binding device 
of the maxim is futile if its verdicts can 
simply be ignored. So the question 
becomes: why should the subject of this 
Law remain bound by reason? It would 
not do to answer by returning to the 
subject’s interest in establishing the 
maxim, for this interest cannot ground 
the integrity and force of reason without 
instrumentalizing it.  
 
This is where Lacan and Žižek detect an 
implacable injunction to obey arising out 
of supreme indifference to the subject’s 
welfare: ‘What does the subject discover 
in himself after he renounces his 
‘pathological’ interests for the sake of the 
autonomous moral law? … An 
unconditional injunction which exerts 
ferocious pressure upon him, 
disregarding his well-being’ (Žižek 1991, 
240). If this is so, the character and 
function of Kantian Law must be 
rethought. Rather than commanding the 
subject to obey, the Law intercedes 
between the subject and the insatiable 
superego, liberating the former from the 
latter’s ruthlessness. The Law (as 
eroticized reason) permits the subject to 
organize its enjoyment by routing it 
through the symbolic order, which 
consequently depends on subjective 
economies of enjoyment for its efficacy.  
 
This leads Žižek to reformulate the logic 
of democracy in terms of  
 
‘a certain fetishistic split: I know 
very well (that the democratic form 
is just a form spoiled by stains of 
‘pathological’ imbalance), but just 
the same (I act as if democracy 
were possible). Far from indicating 
its fatal flaw, this split is the very 
source of the strength of 
democracy: democracy is able to 
take cognizance of the fact that its 
limit lies in itself, in its internal 
‘antagonism’. (Žižek 1992, 168) 
 
Yet this strength becomes the overriding 
problem once the question of enjoyment 
is reintroduced: if public Law intercedes 
between the subject and the superego, 
the explicit stipulation that this Law 
derives legitimacy from the subject itself 
leaves the latter at the mercy of the 
ruthless superego. Worse, absent a 
‘pathological’ ground, the superego now 
speaks precisely from the empty place 
established by the autonomous Law.  
 
Politically, a variant of this conundrum 
compromises ‘the people’ of democracy. 
The law that this people gives itself 
presupposes the existence of this 
people, which can only appear on the 
scene as the subject of this law. In 
Žižek’s account, the standard solution to 
this paradox is to impute universal 
founding authority to an embodied 
people – an ethnos, nation, tribe, social 
class, party, etc. But with this democracy 
is inverted: no longer a formally empty 
universal, it is the hegemonic project of a 
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determinate group. The only alternative 
is to maintain the empty place of power 
at all costs by preventing anyone from 
occupying it. Alas, this is the formula for 
Jacobin terror, which treats any aspirant 
to authority as ipso facto a traitor to ‘the 
people’ (1991, 268). Not without irony, 
Žižek even defends Hegel’s claim that 
only a monarch could properly resolve 
this democratic deadlock by occupying, 
and thereby maintaining as formally 
empty, the place of power (1991, 269).  
 
Yet Žižek is not arguing that democracy 
is impossible or inherently dysfunctional. 
Rather, his point is that this the paradox 
of ‘the people’ explains how democracy, 
in obliterating extramundane authority, 
comes to preempt politics proper: 
 
Democracy is … not only the 
‘institutionalization of the lack in 
the Other’ … By institutionalizing 
the lack, it neutralizes – normalizes 
– it, so that the inexistence of the 
big Other … is again suspended: 
the big Other is again here in the 
guise of the democratic 
legitimization/authorization of our 
acts – in a democracy, my acts are 
‘covered’ as the legitimate acts 
which carry out the will of the 
majority. In contrast to this logic, 
the role of the emancipatory forces 
is not to passively ‘reflect’ the 
opinion of the majority, but to 
create a new majority. (2008) 
 
This is the point of departure for Jodi 
Dean, who draws extensively on Žižek to 
argue that the principle of publicity 
derived from Kant forms the ideological 
fulcrum of ‘communicative capitalism’. 
Dean shows ‘that democratic politics has 
been formatted through a dynamic of 
concealment and disclosure, through a 
primary opposition between what is 
hidden and what is revealed. The fantasy 
of a public to which democracy appeals 
and the ideal of publicity at its normative 
core require the secret as their 
disavowed basis’ (2001, 625). As a 
consequence, today ‘the ideal of a public 
sphere functions as the ideological 
support for global technoculture’, 
including practices of surveillance and 
their analogues (2001, 626).  
 
Following Žižek’s dictum that today 
ideology consists of activities and 
processes that embody beliefs no one 
may espouse, Dean explains how 
‘Practices of concealment and revelation 
materialize belief in … the public … as 
precisely that subject from whom secrets 
are kept and in whom a right to know is 
embedded’ (2001, 629) 5 . Beyond 
sustaining the fiction of ‘the public’, the 
practice of exposing official secrets 
postulates, in order to forestall, the 
possibility that deliberation and 
judgment will take place – if and when 
sufficient information becomes available. 
Thus publicity entails more publicity, 
becoming an end in itself and capturing 
citizens in a circuit of enjoyment derived 
from endlessly repeated acts of 
disclosure, forever deferring the 
promised gratification of collective 
judgment, decision, and action. As Dean 
puts it, the principle of publicity  
 
holds open the possibility that the 
judging public will judge correctly, 
the possibility in which the 
believing public needs to believe. 
The secret marks the absence 
necessary to sustain belief in the 
public supposed to know. It’s that 
                                                
5 As Michael Schudson (2015) has shown, the 
right to know is a recent innovation, emerging in 
the post-war period along with the rise of the 
mass media. 
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missing information warranting the 
rightness of the opinion of the 
public tribunal. Once they have the 
information, the truth, their 
judgment will embody the certainty 
they already have. (2001, 631) 
Accordingly, ‘Publicity, in realizing or 
materializing itself in the practices of 
contemporary technoculture, negates 
itself’ (2001, 628). Meanwhile, the 
implicitly cynical ideal of publicity gives 
technoculture its specific shape as its 
‘emphases on autonomy and 
transparency lead to precisely that 
‘system of distrust’ or suspicious 
subjectivity’ that defines liberalism’s 
conception of power as an empty place, 
to be occupied only precariously (2001, 
638). 
Insofar as Dean follows Žižek, her 
demonstration that publicity subverts 
rather than fulfills the promise of 
democracy stands in stark contrast to 
Žižek’s own endorsement of the 
whistleblowers as ‘spies for the people’. 
How, then, do we understand the 
manifest conflict between these two 
Žižeks, the one for whom the disclosure 
of secrets embodies the public use of 
reason by negating the very principle of 
secrecy, and the one for whom publicity 
is what preempts democracy, forestalling 
the public use of reason it is supposed 
to enact? Or, what does the emergence 
of this antinomy within the logic of 
publicity and its materialization in 
surveillance on the one hand and 
whistleblowing on the other tell us about 
the predicament democracy confronts 
when it stakes itself on the principle of 
supervision? 
The Paradox of Democratic 
Transparency 
Dean’s answer derives from Žižek’s 
thesis concerning the decline of 
symbolic efficiency, which she depicts as 
an effect of the investment in publicity. In 
Žižek’s account, reflexive modernity 
facilitates the collapse of (‘paternal’) 
symbolic authority whose prohibition 
sustains subjectivity and social bonds. 
The result is 
a fundamental uncertainty in our 
relation to our world. We aren’t 
sure what will happen; we can only 
speak about probabilities … 
Likewise, we aren’t sure whom to 
rely on, who has the best data or 
the most impressive credentials. 
Arguments or authorities 
persuasive in one context can have 
no weight in another one – 
primarily because there are lots of 
different kinds of authorization. … 
There isn’t an automatic 
connection or coordination among 
contexts. (Dean 2002, 131–2) 
It follows that ‘expanded communication 
fails to address techno-culture’s 
demands and uncertainties because it 
intensifies them’ (Dean 2002, 130). 
Ritualized public deflation of symbolic 
authority produces paranoid fantasies of 
hidden conspiracies that must be 
exposed again and again, in a self-
perpetuating feedback loop 
indistinguishable from the principle of 
publicity.  
Lacan himself famously foresaw the 
consequences of this ‘liberalization’, 
rebuking the activists of May ’68: ‘What 
you aspire to as revolutionaries is a 
master. You will get one’ (1991, 207). In 
place of a master signifier invested with 
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authority and undergirded by Truth, 
Lacan envisions the rise of University 
discourse, a social logic wherein subjects 
are addressed by expert knowledge that 
presents itself falsely as devoid of 
normative authority, enjoining the 
subject to ‘decide for herself’ without the 
aid of generally binding criteria. 
Consequently, with ‘the collapse of the 
big Other … there is authority, but the 
subject is a remainder; … authority is 
not subjectivized’ (Dean 2006, 85). With 
this, the fiction of Big Brother 
characteristic of the Master’s discourse 
is replaced by that of ‘Little Brothers’ – 
experts and functionaries charged with 
developing empirical knowledge, 
procedural rules and ethical guidelines 
to orient institutional and individual 
decision-making. The rationale 
underpinning the proliferation of Little 
Brothers is the nonexistence of a 
compelling symbolic Law governing 
social life.  
 
Still closely following Žižek, Dean 
explicitly identifies the rule of Little 
Brothers with proliferating surveillance: 
‘Big Brother may not be watching, but 
Little Brothers are. Surveilling our 
transactions and disseminating our 
secrets, a global network of Little 
Brothers trades in information. … Little 
Brothers represent themselves as all of 
us, for all of us’ (2002, 79). She recalls 
Žižek’s example of Bill Gates, who  
 
is not only no longer the 
patriarchal Father-Master, he is 
also no longer the corporate Big 
Brother … he is, rather, a kind of 
little brother: his very ordinariness 
functions as the indication of its 
opposite … that … can no longer 
be rendered in public in the guise 
of some symbolic title. (Žižek 1999, 
347) 
 
Gates’s ‘Power rests not on secrecy but 
on ubiquity – it can’t be avoided; it’s 
everywhere’ (Dean 2002, 82). It does not 
fear publicity but thrives on it. Indeed, 
‘the era of Little Brothers … emerges 
through … an attack on Big Brother’ 
(2002, 83), suggesting that the decline of 
symbolic efficiency is not simply a 
historical transformation but a rhetorical 
project or discursive production. 
 
Dean’s incisive reconstruction and 
critique of the principle of publicity 
through Žižek’s account of the decline of 
symbolic efficiency makes it tempting to 
see recourse to the public use of reason 
as a nostalgic effort to revive the fiction 
of the big Other. If ‘the People’ requires 
the specter of self-serving contenders for 
the empty place of power, the national 
security state is an ideal candidate for 
the job. No doubt Dean would concur 
that the appeal to transparency – ‘spying 
for the people’ – is all but destined to 
serve the democratic fantasy that 
operates precisely by precluding the 
political transformation it purports to 
enact. Everything goes on as it has; ‘the 
people’ have been duly informed and 
can now register their moral outrage and 
sober critical analysis in the digital public 
sphere. In a bitter irony no scholar of the 
attention economy should fail to grasp, 
‘spying for the people’ vitiates democracy 
by performing publicity.  
 
Yet such a judgment would obscure a 
still more insidious process at work. The 
problem surveillance figures in its public 
guise is not reducible to that of the 
decline of symbolic efficiency and the 
self-subversion of democracy. Beyond 
either of these, at stake is the decoupling 
and transformation of operational 
knowledge and the symbolic order 
catalyzed by the conjunction of 
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ubiquitous surveillance, Big Data and 
algorithmic techniques. Put differently, it 
is not symbolic efficiency but its putative 
decline – that is, the cynical, interpassive 
logic of ‘knowingness’ (Andrejevic 2013) – 
that now emerges as the ‘lost object’ to 
which ‘spying for the people’ responds.  
 
Recall that Dean understands 
surveillance technology as embodying, 
rather than inaugurating, the overlap 
between the norm of publicity and the 
decline of symbolic efficiency:  
 
New technologies have virtually 
eliminated the barrier to the 
realization of the public sphere. In 
the networks of mediated 
technoculture … The demand to 
know … extends throughout the 
social as the compulsion to search, 
find, and link exteriorizes belief in 
technologies of dissemination and 
surveillance … (2001, 640) 
 
This realization and intensification of the 
publicity principle provokes a crisis, 
since 
 
The endless exposure of ever more 
secrets, the continued circulation 
of critical reflection, hails each as 
an expert entitled to know, even as 
it undermines any sense that 
anyone knows anything at all. 
Precisely because each is an 
expert, no one believes in the 
expert opinion of anyone else. 
Everybody has to find out for 
themselves. (2001, 643) 
 
Less polemically, Niklas Luhmann 
depicts this phenomenon as the 
operationalization of reflexivity, whereby 
social systems function by submitting 
their own programming to routinized 
scrutiny in order to identify the blind 
spots it inevitably generates. As a result, 
such systems function by ‘exposing’ the 
cognitive deficits produced by their own 
operational distinctions, continually 
marking the unity of cognition with such 
deficits.6 Hence the University discourse 
of reflexive modernity posits knowledge 
as the ongoing, functional (re)production 
of its own limits, and thus axiomatically 
lacking normative authority. Hence the 
mundane operation of reflexive systems 
is now often indistinguishable from 
endlessly recurring system failure.7 
 
This paradox entails that the production 
of knowledge is in itself the assertion of 
lack, as well as its converse. Systemic 
reflexivity uncouples knowledge from 
normativity, rendering each functionally 
contingent. As a result, not only is 
everyone entitled – or enjoined – to 
know or to have an opinion; knowledge 
comes into view in the guise of opinion, 
partial and undermined in advance, 
                                                
6 This productive coincidence of knowledge with 
its own incompleteness is precisely what 
Foucault identified as the guiding principle of 
liberal political economy, whose paradigmatic 
topos is the impossibility of sovereign knowledge. 
The political principle of supervision over the 
empty place of power has its counterpart in 
market theory: ‘Kant…had to tell man that he 
cannot know the totality of the world. Well, some 
decades earlier, political economy had told the 
sovereign: Not even you can know the totality of 
the economic process. There is no sovereign in 
economics. There is no economic sovereign’’ 
(Foucault 2008, 283). 
 
7 That is, the effective operation of reflexive 
systems positions authoritative determinacy as a 
functional criterion of discrimination. Such 
systems ‘recognize’ or specify cognitive deficits 
by reference to this criterion. The aim is never to 
eliminate the deficits but to carry out new 
operations in response to them. In this sense, 
reflexive systems are governed by the Lacanian 
logic of drive: each operation is designed to 
‘miss’ what appears to be its ‘aim’, but this 
appearance should not deceive us – the aim is 
the operation itself. 
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declaring its own incapacity in the 
intentional structure of its form. 
Moreover, this renunciation of normative 
authority is precisely the source of 
knowledge’s legitimacy. It counts as 
knowledge precisely to the degree that it 
disavows any claim to authorize, ratify or 
compel a course of action, and the 
moment it is marshaled on behalf of 
concrete policy initiatives, it ceases to 
appear as knowledge altogether.  
 
Crucially, however, the anxiety-producing 
short-circuit Žižek identifies with cynical 
reason remains a resolutely symbolic 
operation. Cynicism presupposes a 
semiotic/rhetorical articulation between 
knowledge and authority that it 
promises, undercuts, defers, eroticizes, 
transgresses, denounces, etc. By 
contrast, the anxiety surrounding 
algorithmic dataveillance is that the form 
of knowledge it claims to produce is no 
longer supposed to be symbolic at all. If 
so, the problem is more than the 
adequacy or legitimacy of what either 
Big Brother or Little Brothers can be 
imagined to know or demand; it is that 
neither is pertinent even to our 
normatively cynical relationship with it.  
 
 
Prohibiting the Impossible 
 
If pervasive social reflexivity mandates 
cynical and/or paranoid economies of 
enjoyment organized around endless re-
articulations of knowledge and authority, 
algorithmic dataveillance threatens to 
abolish such economies altogether. This 
becomes evident in the symptomatic 
contradiction between the prevailing 
concerns about the consequences of 
surveillance. In his Delo interview, 
Assange explains that  
 
The agencies whose activities we 
disclose can only thrive in shadow, 
they are like creepy and sleazy 
beetles which start to run around 
in panic when the stone which was 
shielding them from the daylight is 
torn away. This is why our 
revelations weakened their 
authority. Once their acts are 
rendered public, we no longer 
really fear them, we all of a sudden 
see them in their misery and vain 
arrogance mixed with stupidity. … 
They are definitely not real life 
James Bonds. More a vast number 
of sickly office workers dreaming 
about their next holiday.  
 
One cannot fail to detect Assange’s 
pleasure in humiliating these impotent 
spies – a pleasure that for Žižek defines 
contemporary ideology, wherein ‘the 
superficial cynicism of Western 
individuals conceals subjects’ 
unconscious, conformist identifications 
with the existing order, actually 
supported by the enjoyment we take in 
pointing out the corruption and 
incompetence of our leaders, bosses and 
bureaucrats’ (Sharpe & Boucher 2010, 
98). This is precisely the enjoyment 
animating Assange’s critique of Little 
Brothers, fueling the gleeful drive to 
‘make things public’. Invoking Arendt, he 
goes on to affirm that today the banality 
of evil resides in bureaucratic stupidity 
and perverse institutional outcomes, 
rather than malign intentions. Thus the 
ultimate incapacity of the surveillance 
apparatus inheres in its very activity: the 
security project as such is absurd; it 
cannot succeed; it is self-defeating; and 
its threat lies chiefly in its obscurity and 
misprision.  
 
Notice that, despite Žižek’s depiction of 
the whistleblowers’ acts as conduits for 
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public reason, Assange’s primary claim is 
not that ‘the public’ will be able to use 
the leaked information to supervise, 
debate, judge, direct, or impede the 
actions of the authorities (whom he 
hardly regards as ‘our’ representatives 
possessing the requisite symbolic status). 
Instead, the true force of the revelations 
is that they expose not power but 
impotence – a lack concealed by 
secrecy. Nor is this impotence reducible 
to a legitimacy gap resulting from the 
cynical hypocrisy of their behavior. After 
all, they are ‘just like us’ – ordinary 
functionaries in a massive, clumsy 
bureaucracy who display no 
distinguishing feature that might 
legitimize their access to the levers of 
power. Yet what surprised Assange most 
‘was the blindness and ignorance of the 
average personnel in the US intelligence, 
diplomatic and defense establishment. 
… they are so obviously unable to draw 
a coherent global picture from the 
billions of data they collect’.  
 
What, then, is the source of his disgust – 
that ‘they’ are illicitly watching, or that 
‘they’ lack the capacity to make sense of 
what they see? For an anarcho-
libertarian like Assange, it is surely the 
latter: someone must be watching, 
working tirelessly to occupy the empty 
place of power. But if watching yields no 
knowledge, then it poses no threat – and 
therefore puts in jeopardy the very 
principle of freedom arrogated to the 
collection of individuals he calls ‘the 
people’. On its own, the ‘discovery’ of 
stupidity or incompetence should hardly 
be surprising; it reassures by confirming 
the axiom of reflexive modernity pivotal 
to the structure of fetishistic disavowal: ‘I 
know very well that those in power are 
effete minions just like me, but 
nevertheless I must keep my secrets 
from them’. Clearly a more vexing 
possibility disturbs Assange: it is not only 
or primarily for reasons of incompetence 
that no coherent global picture has 
emerged, nor even because such a 
picture is impossible – both are defining 
postulates of cynical reason.  
 
In reprising this paradigmatic ideological 
gesture, then, whistleblowers demand 
that the NSA be prohibited from doing 
what they triumphantly demonstrate it 
cannot do – a gesture that Žižek himself 
repeats, and one entirely consistent with 
explicit official justifications of 
dataveillance. Likewise, the kettle logic of 
this demand pervades the critical 
literature on surveillance and Big Data, 
up to and including most ‘post-panoptic’ 
approaches predicated on displacing the 
conceptual priority of the citizen-subject 
in favor of a focus on ubiquitous control 
strategies deployed across distributed 
populations and spaces of agency. Even 
here it is common simultaneously to 
accept and reject the claims made on 
behalf of algorithmic dataveillance, so 
that extraordinary power is attributed to 
the apparatus even as it is dismissed as 
futile.  
 
To take an apposite example, Kate 
Crawford (2014) identifies what she calls 
‘surveillant anxiety – the fear that all the 
data we are shedding every day is too 
revealing of our intimate selves but may 
also misrepresent us’. To this she 
juxtaposes its ‘conjoined twin’ – the 
‘anxiety of the surveillers … that no 
matter how much data they have, it is 
always incomplete, and the sheer 
volume can overwhelm the critical 
signals in a fog of correlations’. Indeed, 
she asserts that this is ‘why Snowden’s 
revelations are so startling: they make it 
possible for us to see the often-obscured 
concerns of the intelligence agencies’. 
Like Assange, she thus performs a 
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parody of the very hermeneutic crisis 
she is depicting: now, it is the failure to 
know that is the true secret being 
concealed from the ostensible objects of 
knowledge and control.  
But if data collection systematically 
defers the knowledge it seems to 
promise, then this promise itself must be 
interrogated. What if ‘The current 
mythology of big data’ is not ‘that with 
more data comes greater accuracy and 
truth’? Certainly, Big Data evangelists 
have consistently claimed something 
entirely different. In a gesture typical of 
Big Data’s proponents, David Weinberger 
(2016) argues that, among other things, 
knowledge is rapidly becoming 
intrinsically fragmented, distributed 
across dynamic networks in such a way 
that it would cease to function as 
knowledge at all if forced into legacy 
forms predicated on integration and 
representation. Distributed, networked 
and supersized, data becomes useful 
and actionable on condition that it does 
not become knowledge in the 
conventional sense: 
As the rules of behavior become 
more complex, we lose that sense, 
which may be illusory in any case. 
… We can model these and
perhaps know how they work 
without understanding them. They 
are so complex that only our 
artificial brains can manage the 
amount of data and the number of 
interactions involved. (195) 
On this account, Big Data analytics 
disallows the symbolic game that works 
by vesting knowledge in authority and 
vice versa – even if only to deploy this 
investment cynically by organizing 
enjoyment around gestures of 
unmasking and humiliating the impotent 
big Other. Such games are neither 
possible nor effective within the 
epistemic regime of infoglut. 
To be clear, the contention is not that 
the arguments on behalf of Big Data are 
credible or its promises viable; it’s that 
critics persistently refuse to engage the 
arguments entirely, opting instead to 
ascribe to the advocates views that their 
arguments explicitly refute. For every 
Anderson (2008) or Mayer-Schönberger 
(2013) arguing assiduously that Big Data 
inaugurates a new epistemic age, there 
is a Floridi (2012) or Frické (2015) 
insisting that Big Data is uninformative 
outside the strictures of scientific 
epistemology. Never mind that the actual 
claim is not that Big Data can produce 
scientific knowledge in its standard form 
without relying on hypotheses, but 
precisely that it can generate a 
functionally equivalent but entirely 
different form of ‘predictive power’, so 
that ‘We have a new form of knowing’ 
(Weinberger 2011). And never mind if 
organizations presumed to be deluded 
that more data yields accuracy and truth 
are instead proceeding from the premise 
that ‘the usefulness of big data rests on 
their steady updatability’ (Constantiou & 
Kallinikos 2014).  
What if the fact that ‘The risk of being 
seduced by ghost patterns in data 
increases with the size of the data sets’ 
(Crawford 2104) is central to the entire 
project, for better or worse? This axiom is 
certainly central to Andrejevic’s 
argument, which demonstrates 
convincingly that the surplus of data – 
infoglut – is not a problem but a strategy. 
What looks to Crawford like anxiety – an 
NSA PowerPoint slide ostensibly asking, 
‘What can we, the Little Brothers 
overwhelmed by data, tell?’ – is the 
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operational principle of communicative 
capitalism.  
After all, what emerges in the very act of 
divulging such an exorbitantly vast 
archive of documents is that such a 
comprehensive picture – the requisite 
point of departure for collective 
deliberation postulated by the principle 
of publicity; or a panoptic snapshot of 
security threats – cannot be the goal. 
The massive aggregation of data 
presupposes the impossibility of 
understanding and interpretation; there 
could be no hermeneutics, suspicious or 
otherwise, capable of conferring upon it 
the structure of a text – even an 
unbounded and irreducibly contested 
one. This is why Snowden’s decision to 
release the documents through the 
journalistic filter cannot fully be 
explained in terms of his avowed wish to 
comply with the strictures of national 
security and the norms of publicity. The 
decisive function assigned to this filter 
consists in its presumed capacity to 
‘read’ the documents, to transform them 
into both evidence of official 
transgression and into a more or less 
coherent text capable of ascribing both 
cognitive and strategic competence to 
the state. Greenwald, Poitras, Gellman, et 
al. become Snowden’s agents in the 
project of endowing the national security 
apparatus with a grounding in discursive 
logic that his trove of documents 
declares obsolete. Their assigned task is 
to render legible a database whose very 
existence and form make acts of reading 
superfluous – and with them, the entire 
notion that social life is predicated on 
symbolic activity. Searching for 
understanding and normative meaning 
in those documents entails submitting 
them to a procedure that Big Data aims 
– however inanely – to supersede
(Anderson 2008). Beyond salvaging the 
fiction of a big Other from its long 
decline facilitated by the public use of 
reason, it is in this precise sense that we 
should understand ‘spying for the 
people’, namely, as the activity of 
recuperating ‘cynical’ symbolic 
operations purportedly deposed by 
algorithms and Big Data. 
If algorithmic dataveillance proclaims the 
end of the ‘hermeneutic’ model of the 
symbolic as the matrix of sociality, it 
signals a far more serious challenge than 
the decline of symbolic authority and the 
rise of cynical reason, which remain 
predicated on this model. Where 
symbolic Law institutes a prohibition that 
establishes a range of possible 
economies of enjoyment, algorithmic 
dataveillance renounces the normative 
proposition in favor of statistically 
emergent contingencies. Where 
prohibition yields suspicion of the 
deviant, dataveillance values the insights 
generated by departures from statistical 
uniformity. Where symbolic knowledge 
entails attributing, understanding and 
addressing structures of motivation, 
dataveillance abandons causality in favor 
of correlations. Where knowledge serves 
to establish authority and underpins 
judgment, dataveillance claims neither; 
its value is intrinsically speculative, 
derived from a stochastic range of 
possible transformations across multiple 
contexts. In fact, the performative 
capacity of algorithmic dataveillance is 
proportionate to the indeterminacy and 
deferral of its value as information. 
Some, such as Haggerty, Massumi, 
Amoore, Bauman, and others, have laid 
out an alternative approach that seeks to 
break with the ‘representationalist’ 
premises underlying most critiques of 
dataveillance. But even these remain 
wedded to a hierarchical model that 
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ascribes epistemological and agentive 
privilege to what amount to Little 
Brothers. David Lyon, among the most 
astute scholars of surveillance, observes 
in relation to the Snowden revelations 
that  
 
Now bulk data are obtained and … 
aggregated from different sources 
before determining the full range of 
their actual and potential uses and 
mobilizing algorithms and analytics 
not only to understand a past 
sequence of events but also to 
predict and intervene before 
behaviors, events, and processes 
are set in train. (2014, 4) 
 
Even as he endorses the standard 
critique according to which algorithmic 
dataveillance curtails democratic 
freedoms, Lyon’s own analysis here 
refutes its underlying premises. Here, 
knowledge is no longer composed of 
information governed by understanding. 
Instead, dataveillance mandates and 
multiplies indeterminacy, so that action 
can take the place of understanding, on 
the basis of statistical possibility rather 
than ‘intelligence’. The operational 
principle precludes grasping ‘a past 
sequence of events’ as anything other 
than a contingent confluence, governed 
not by causal principles but by emergent 
correlations among proliferating 
variables – and thus not governed at all. 
The ostensible object of knowledge is 
abolished in advance by means of this 
recursive form of knowledge. Decisions 
become self-referential and interminably 
speculative, as each intervention 
produces additional variables and 
correlations to track and analyze.  
 
Likewise, the standard critical claim that 
‘Raw Data’ Is an Oxymoron (Gitelman 
2013), because its collection and 
analysis requires normative assumptions 
about what counts as data and 
performatively imposes those 
assumptions on the social world, 
overlooks the way data come to be 
treated as ‘raw’ by being endowed with 
indeterminate, speculative value. The 
form of their eventual utility is not 
stabilized or prescribed in advance and 
thus is not governed by prior normative 
expectations, which may themselves 
come into view only through algorithmic 
data processing. As Amoore (2013) 
demonstrates, Big Data acquires value as 
information still to come; it is more 
valuable ‘raw’ than ‘cooked’ – that is, 
outside assimilation as knowledge, 
confined to ambiguous opacity – this is 
essential to its utility.8 
 
Exposing hidden motivations behind the 
data 9  is far more reassuring than 
confronting the implications of this novel, 
feral form of rawness, insofar as always 
already ‘cooked’ data figures algorithmic 
procedures as fundamentally represent-
ational. Hence the operative question is 
                                                
8 Amoore sees data speculation as a feature of a 
new logic of sovereignty. Following Massumi 
(2010), she argues that the speculative character 
of Big Data creates the conditions for more or 
less arbitrary decisions, legitimated by the very 
impossibility of rendering data intelligible. Though 
sympathetic to this line of argument, I 
nonetheless contend that even the logic of 
sovereignty is rendered virtually obsolete by 
algorithmic correlationism, which promises to 
bypass the exercise of authority by facilitating 
forms of intervention that don’t register as 
decisions at all, because they consist in 
modifying the relative probability of possible 
events. Against the force of her analysis, 
Amoore’s investment in the category of 
sovereignty turns her provocative insights into an 
argument for more democracy. 
 
9 And it’s worth noting that, ideally at least, Big 
Data means approaching n=all (hence ‘total 
awareness’), thus obviating the distorting 
influence of preconceptions as to what counts. 
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whether the ‘right’ sorts of meanings will 
be produced, by whom, and toward what 
ends. The salient risk is that of 
misrepresentation, distortion, or false 
attribution. In this vision of encroaching 
surveillance, the citizen-subject is 
precluded from speaking for itself, as 
itself, in its own words; the data speak 
her into being through the ventriloquism 
of the surveillance apparatus. Even the 
stipulation that ‘far from there being an 
‘all-knowing state, what we have instead 
is a plethora of partial projects and 
initiatives that are seeking to harness 
ICTs in the service of better knowing and 
governing individuals and populations’ 
(Ruppert 2012, 118) continues to rely on 
this fantasy. For Lyon, ‘These data ‘make 
up’ the people in the system purview, in 
ways that are constantly shifting, 
fluctuating. In this way, a neo-liberal logic 
of control fits neatly with the ways that 
individuals are ‘made up’ by data’ (2014, 
6.) In place of Big Brother, we find the 
incorrigible logic of neoliberal biopolitics; 
and in place of concrete albeit alienated 
subjects, we find ‘data doubles’ that 
performatively impose on us a pre-
defined set of available options and 
practical life chances. Yet as soon as we 
see that these fictional objects function 
as algorithmic reiterations of social roles, 
it becomes increasingly difficult to 
discern the difference between 
cybernetic control and conventional 
symbolic power. 
 
Politically and methodologically, this 
implies that even the most farsighted 
critiques of techno-culture don’t quite 
suffice. Even when it breaks with 
panopticism and turns to theories of 
distributed control and speculative or 
preemptive intervention, the critical 
literature on surveillance after Snowden 
continues to display the kettle logic 
implicit in Assange’s claim to be ‘spying 
for the people’, wherein algorithmic 
dataveillance must be prevented from 
learning what it cannot know – yet 
should. This is evident in the line of 
critique that accepts the claims made on 
behalf of algorithmic correlationism, 
arguing that the latter suffers from ‘Big 
Data hubris’ (Lazer et al., 2014). Echoing 
Assange, here the big Other is watching 
but cannot see, losing sight of both 
individuals and their enmeshment in 
collective life (Amoore 2014, 111). 
Ironically, this amounts less to a defense 
of democracy than to a call for 
‘conventional methods’, or a return to the 
primacy of authoritative symbolic 
knowledge. In other words, whether 
formulated as a critique of the epistemic 
excess of algorithmic dataveillance or of 
its epistemic lack, the demand for 
democratic supervision – the public use 
of reason, or ‘spying for the people’ – 
functions as a demand for the 
transgression of symbolic authority that 
the leaks exposed as superfluous. 
 
 
Symbolic Efficiency after Cynicism? 
 
To be sure, corporate dataveillance is an 
insidious form of exploitation, and the 
operationalization of cynicism so 
cogently elucidated by Dean and 
Andrejevic really does immunize 
entrenched political interests from the 
force of critical reason. However, the 
ongoing transformation in the structure 
of knowledge and its disconnection from 
authority involve consequences that the 
categories of transgression, exploitation 
and cynicism inadvertently occlude. This 
is because the decline of symbolic 
efficiency can no longer account for the 
paranoid fantasy of an intrusive, 
ubiquitous Other of the Other in the 
shape of the national security apparatus 
and its corporate collaborators. Similarly, 
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the fact that data always serves some 
interests at the expense of others is not 
sufficient to ground efficacious critique 
of and resistance to dataveillance, since 
it does not reach the latter’s ideological 
kernel. This kernel is not the myth that 
data can speak for itself but the 
declaration that data need never amount 
to knowledge, because there is nothing 
to know and no sense in knowing. In 
public discourse about dataveillance, the 
possibility most anxiously disavowed is 
that advocates of dataveillance are 
telling the truth, so that the symbolic 
production or attribution of meaning is 
not even cynically regarded as a ground 
of social bonds.  
 
This anxiety pervades journalistic 
attempts to grapple with the Snowden 
revelations. For example, in the PBS 
documentary ‘United States of Secrets’ 
(2014), the dramatic conflict centers on 
the incapacity of the people’s 
representatives to serve the public 
interest. The agents practicing 
surveillance ‘in all good conscience’ still 
cannot know: the data is ever insufficient; 
there is too much of it; it yields only 
partial, conflicting information; it resists 
coherence; it cannot take the place of 
‘human intelligence’ based on 
relationships. Even their own legal 
authorization to collect it is concealed 
from them. And since the programs are 
classified, insiders who regard their own 
activity as a transgression of legitimate 
public authority are nevertheless 
powerless to impede it. By framing the 
story in this way, this performance of 
watchdog journalism delivers the 
observation of the public’s paradoxical 
impotence as observer: what it knows is 
precisely that it neither knows nor is able 
to confer legitimacy. 
 
Moreover, the documentary devotes 
considerable diegetic time to bewildered 
speculation about the excessive yet 
largely futile efforts by the intelligence 
apparatus to prevent leaks. Exorbitant 
threats and aggressive gestures 
(searches, confiscations, intimidations, 
interrogations, etc.) leveled against a 
suspected network of conspirators 
amount to little beyond pointless 
financial hardship for a couple of hapless 
bureaucrats. In fact, the very requirement 
to maintain secrecy hampers efforts to 
police it, blocking the intramural flow of 
information necessary for effective 
institutional control. Moreover, 
surveillance is commonly rationalized by 
direct appeal to non-knowledge, whether 
by corporate claims that algorithms 
‘work by themselves’, without human 
intervention, by state claims to 
anonymize data, or, more radically, by 
claims that the unimaginable quantity of 
data collected, precisely because it is 
effectively comprehensive, tells us 
nothing, serving only to generate 
statistical ranges of correlation legible 
exclusively in algorithmic terms. 
 
One uncanny sequence in the film 
epitomizes the deadlock at stake. The 
story concerns California state Senator 
Liz Figueroa’s meeting with Sergei Brin 
concerning Google’s email data mining 
practices. According to Figueroa, Brin 
volunteered the so-called Robot Defense, 
claiming that if Google software bots 
read user email, extract relevant data for 
aggregated analysis, and then self-
destruct, user privacy remains intact. The 
Senator incredulously rejects this 
interpretation, insisting to Brin, and to 
the audience, that such a procedure 
obviously violates privacy. But why? If she 
is right, then software processing of user 
data amounts to a form of knowledge 
that Brin understands as inherently 
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foreclosed. So we are left with two 
options: either Figueroa is right, and 
algorithms really do function as the 
Other of the Other; or Brin is right, and 
the entire symbolic edifice is simply 
obsolete. Clearly, Figueroa cannot 
countenance the latter possibility, 
preferring to imbue Google bots with the 
very symbolic capacities they are 
designed to supersede. Her outraged 
refusal is uncanny in its incapacity to 
offer any reasons whatsoever in support 
of the willful misreading of algorithmic 
dataveillance. She simply, and urgently, 
insists that the bots do violate privacy, 
unable to explain how this is so: ‘That 
robot has read everything. Does that 
robot know if I’m sad, or if I’m feeling 
fear, or what’s happening? And he looked 
at me and he said, “Oh no. That robot 
knows a lot more than that”’. 
 
Brin’s point, of course, is that the robot’s 
knowledge is of the wrong sort, which is 
what Figueroa cannot entertain. Yet this 
is also the primary justification for state 
surveillance, offered explicitly in the 
Obama administration’s own claims to 
be ‘spying for the people’ and the 
President’s perfunctory appeal to the 
principle of democratic supervision:  
 
I welcome this debate. And I think 
it’s healthy for our democracy. I 
think it’s a sign of maturity, 
because probably five years ago, 
six years ago, we might not have 
been having this debate. … I think 
that’s good that we’re having this 
discussion. … But I think it’s 
important to recognize that you 
can’t have a hundred percent 
security and also then have a 
hundred percent privacy and zero 
inconvenience. … And the fact that 
they’re under very strict supervision 
by all three branches of 
government and that they do not 
involve listening to people’s phone 
calls, do not involve reading the 
emails of U.S. citizens or U.S. 
residents, absent further action by 
a federal court, that is entirely 
consistent with what we would do, 
for example, in a criminal 
investigation. (2013) 
 
Obama’s reassurance that ‘nobody is 
listening’ is surely disingenuous, but it is 
far more disturbing if taken at face 
value.10 Here, beyond the risk that the 
procedures or the data will be misused, 
that calls will be directly overheard or 
innocent citizens targeted, or that the 
dragnet approach contravenes 
democratic principles, lies the very 
                                                
10 Roger Clarke pointed out some three decades 
ago that ‘rather than individuals themselves, what 
is monitored is the data that purport to relate to 
them. As a result there is a significant likelihood 
of wrong identification’ (Clarke 1988, 406). But 
the correlational logic of dataveillance has since 
rendered this problem largely irrelevant. This is 
because today the ‘risk’ of misidentification is a 
positive feature of the system, supposed to 
immunize the NSA from charges of ‘spying on 
American citizens’. It is also what makes web 
marketing work, since ads are targeted to activity 
patterns as opposed to discrete values, needs, 
preferences, psychographic features, etc. that 
standard advertising uses to sort audiences. 
Although marketing firms claim that activity is an 
indicator of interests, it is an indicator supposed 
to bypass, rather than reflect, consumer 
preferences. In other words, it is supposed to 
address our or ‘revealed’ preferences rather than 
those identified by interpretive analysis such as 
surveys, focus groups, psychological studies, etc. 
Hence the sales pitch and the nightmare 
scenario for this sort of targeting are one and the 
same: ‘Advertisers know you better than, and 
before, you do’. The force of this claim lies not in 
its validity but precisely in its capacity to 
circumvent or preempt all questions of validity. 
Algorithmic targeting always hits its mark, 
because it determines what this mark is in the 
first place, as well as what counts as ‘hitting’ it. 
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transformation of what the callers 
themselves regard as communication 
into an alien form defined by the 
conjunction of database and algorithm. 
Neither accessible to nor 
comprehensible by people at all, this 
‘communication’ does not aim at 
understanding and thus neither 
presupposes nor reproduces the rules of 
the social game, which are expelled 
beyond the scope of what it means to 
maintain collective life.  
 
In this regard, dataveillance may seem 
homologous with Kantian duty: it 
appears utterly indifferent to the 
particularity of social bonds and affective 
investments that make life intelligible, 
and therefore livable. There are, however, 
crucial differences. Most obviously, data 
does not enjoin or even address, 
opaquely circulating among 
computational systems or, conversely, 
appearing tautologically to return our 
own messages to us in place of 
responses from an Other. Unlike the 
sadistic superego, it commands nothing. 
And rather than generating means of 
comprehending subjects and 
relationships, it confronts them with the 
statistical promiscuity of sociality, which 
it asserts is governed not by chains of 
meaning (however ephemeral or 
recalcitrant) but by chance, probability, 
covariance, emergence, etc.  
 
As Rita Raley points out, this sort of data 
collection is inherently speculative, 
amassed ‘so as to produce patterns, as 
opposed to having an idea from which 
one needs to collect supporting data. 
Raw data is the material for 
informational patterns still to come, its 
value is unknown or uncertain until it is 
converted into currency of information 
(Raley, 123).11 Put another way, it is only 
by means of producing a kind of 
permanent cognitive deficit that it can 
function as currency. More to the point, 
Raley’s own analysis of ‘data derivatives’ 
converges with Massumi’s and Amoore’s 
arguments about preemption: the genius 
of speculative data analysis is that it 
inoculates decision-makers against the 
imperatives of causality. They can claim 
credit for ‘preventing’ events that might 
never have taken place, precisely 
because it is impossible to know one 
way or the other. And they can excuse 
failures as results of reducible but 
ineliminable probability. 
 
 
The Mute People of Data Democracy 
 
To be clear, what matters here is not the 
likelihood of realizing the disturbing 
promise of nonrepresentational 
knowledge but the function of this 
promise in organizing the socio-political 
field. In an illuminating essay, Rob 
Horning (2014) frets that 
 
Surveillance and quantification 
produce the self as a set of 
statistics, a manipulatable data 
object.… Rather than capturing 
‘our own will’, it circumvents it; it 
predicts what we want without our 
willing anything. Even if the 
prediction is initially wrong, 
preferential placement in the 
                                                
11 Rita Raley, ‘Dataveillance and Countervailance’, 
in Raw Data Is an Oxymoron, Lisa Gitelman, ed. 
(2013). For Raley, ‘the act [of countervailance] is 
neither a protocol nor sabotage but both, and 
self-reflexively so’ (138). Indeed, ‘positioned as we 
are within the dataveillance regime, we cannot 
but employ the tactics of immanent critique’. 
However, it is not precisely ‘we’ who employ 
them; as the system includes this critique as an 
integral feature of its design and operation, ‘we’ 
are beside the point – as is ‘critique’ 
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platform, and the efficacy of the 
subsequent feedback loops can 
make it so…(social media plus Big 
Data) makes our will superfluous. 
 
Like Bowker (2014), Andrejevic, Raley 
(2013), and boyd & Crawford (2012), 
Horning is rightly skeptical of claims 
made on behalf of Big Data, which ‘only 
raises more questions than it answers 
about the populations under 
surveillance’, because ‘the more data you 
have, the more crises of interpretation 
you confront, leading to more data 
collection and deeper crises’. This 
skepticism, however, tacitly accepts what 
the operational axioms of Big Data 
explicitly deny, namely that the goal is 
some form of understanding that calls 
for interpretation: ‘The more information 
about the masses we have, the more we 
uncover that there is to know, which 
makes the masses recede even further 
into their massive inscrutability’. Far from 
marking the limit of Big Data, however, 
this apparent paradox is simply its 
functional principle. The aim of 
dataveillance is not modeling or 
understanding an external object but the 
endless reproduction of this object’s 
statistical indeterminacy and opacity as 
the protocol of the system’s continuing 
operation. This is what leads Andrejevic 
to argue that ‘infoglut’ is itself the 
mechanism of power. We can thus see 
why in hyperreality the two inevitably 
converge: power (as vigilant connectivity) 
and resistance (the silence or 
recalcitrance attributed to the masses) 
belong to the same logic of simulation.  
 
Both dimensions are clearly discernable 
in the position incongruously staked out 
by Assange, who dismisses NSA data 
gathering as self-defeating because it 
can never generate the superfluous 
‘global picture’, while nevertheless 
insisting that ‘spying for the people’ is 
essential to resist and supervise the 
ubiquitous and invasive dataveillance 
apparatus. Yet again we are caught 
between two interrelated yet 
incompatible alternatives: dataveillance 
is the eclipse of the social and it is 
overrated, unable finally to deliver on its 
promise. If the latter is true, we need not 
worry about the former; if the former is 
true, the latter cannot be. It almost goes 
without saying that this inconsistency 
marks the place of ‘the people’ of 
democracy: 
 
For Baudrillard, those de-
individuated populations ruled over 
through monitoring, statistical 
modeling, and predictive analytics 
are supposed to be ‘the social’ – 
i.e., the ‘reality’ of what the data 
measures, the population on which 
power can be exercised by what he 
tends to call the ‘system’ – but they 
instead are becoming ‘the masses’, 
an amorphous blob of individuals 
that eludes certain management by 
its sheer inertia, which proves 
uninterpretable even as the system 
throws more resources at trying to 
understand what it wants or where 
it is headed. (Horning 2014) 
  
In contrast to Žižek’s return to Kant’s 
public use of reason, which presupposes 
symbolic forms of identification, 
misrecognition, affective investment, and 
fetishistic disavowal, for Horning, as for 
Dean, participation and speech are the 
means of ‘reducing’ the people to the 
masses. It is therefore reticent silence – 
the inverse of public reason – that 
‘speaks in the name of the people’. This 
might be tolerable, except that this 
reticence is itself an effect of algorithmic 
dataveillance, which implacably 
produces the illegible, mute masses. 
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Accordingly, there is nothing agentive or 
proto-democratic in this ‘resistance’; it 
conceals no secret, projects no space of 
appearance, and harbors no capacity to 
supervise. 
 
The turn to ‘the people’, then, cannot aim 
at refurbishing the democratic ideal that 
Žižek, like Assange, has long since 
rejected as an ideological ruse. Rather, it 
aims precisely at recovering the relatively 
reassuring logic of cynical reason itself. 
Accordingly, the public discussion of the 
whistleblowers involves the kettle logic of 
the incest taboo – that of ‘prohibiting the 
impossible’ supposed to found the 
symbolic. This is the only way to account 
for the prevailing media frame that 
persistently articulates together mutually 
exclusive alternatives, effectively 
asserting that algorithmic dataveillance 
is inoperable and therefore must be 
forbidden. Or, conversely, that revealing 
the secrets of dataveillance poses grave 
danger (‘treason’) even though the 
databases are both harmless (‘no one is 
listening’) and inscrutable (there is no 
context adequate for making sense of it 
all). ‘They’ must be prohibited from 
knowing everything not simply because 
they cannot know it properly (this is 
already presupposed as a basic feature 
of the symbolic order as such), but 
because the sort of knowledge 
dataveillance seems to generate short-
circuits the logic of the symbolic 
altogether. We can tolerate – in fact, we 
expect and even demand – the 
authorities to transgress their official 
limits, proving unworthy of their roles as 
bearers of democratically legitimized 
authority. What we cannot tolerate is the 
possibility that, with all available 
information at their disposal, they still 
cannot know what we insist they must 
not know. The limit they confront is not 
that of the unrepresentable or the secret 
(which is, after all, the condition of 
possibility for privacy and subjectivity); 
rather, it is that algorithmic dataveillance 
renders representability and secrecy 
superfluous for social reproduction. 
Prohibiting this impossible form of 
knowledge is the project of restoring 
symbolic epistemology to its ‘proper’ 
place as the ground of the social. 
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